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Article 2

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
By Enwi W HADLEY
The action for damages for a .m-re breach of promise to
marry was unknown to the Roman: law, as well as to other contemporaneots or precedent legal systems.1 "The betrothal, by
the Roman law, creates no action to compel the entering into
marriage nor for damages."12 The broad statement contra of
the note in 9 Corpus Juris 322 is inaccurate, for the broad action
on contract with lenient elements of damage is very different
from a restricted action compensating for actual pecuniary loss.
On dissolution of the Roman sponsalia by mutual agreement, gifts
could be mutually recovered, and if one party broke the betrothal without cause the other could keep gifts received and demand
double return of gifts given to the wrongful party; but no contract
action, with damages for lost expectancy, hurt feelings, etc., was
allowed or thought of. In the case of Short v. Stotts,$ the Indiana
Court also falls into error when it says "the principle which upholds such action is as old as the principle which gives damages
in any case for the breach of a contract." In no country did the
early law look on a betrothal as a contract, business or otherwise; any rights in connection with it were special and peculiar,
and usually were a matter for a spiritual court.
This early rule of the civil law i*s still followed in Austria,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Chili, France, and other
countries using other than Anglo-American law, although at intermittent ti ies their ecclesiastical courts have punished the
breaker of a betrothal by varied means in which damages were.
never an element. In some of these countries a civil action for
seduction, or for the loss of property of a value estimable in
cash, is specially allowed by statute', but there is no pretence of
calling the obligation contractual and broad elements of damage
are not allowed.
In Anglo-Saxon times in England, when there were no
separate ecclesiastical courts, the people and the law looked on
1 Sherman, Roman -jaw in the Modern World, § 459; 4 Am. and Eng.
Cyc., 2nd ed., 882; 10 Law Quarterly Rev. 135.
2 MacKeldey's Roman Law 14th German ed. transl. by Dropsie, p. 411.
s 58 Ind. 29, 35.
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a 'betrothal as a purely social matter, no court action for -breach
of -promise being allowed as far as any records show. The
actions of tort, covenant, and debt were not conceived to cover
this non-business and extra-legal dispute. After the Norman
conquest, and the advent of -the pontificate of Pope Alexander
III in 1159, separate ecclesiastical courts were created, and as
,part of their jurisdiction over marriage they took the power to
force specific performance of the promise to marry. This innovation in England was purely spiritual; -no contractual theory
was pretended or thought of and -no damages were given.4 For
four centuries this continental idea continued in England.
By 'the middle of the sixteenth century the English common
law courts had developed the -action of assumpsit, the efficacious
remedy for breach of -a simple :nsealed contract. The judges
were_paid by the number of cases handled,. so they were properly
anxious to add to 'their jurisdicfion; -and their great jealousy for
the ecclesiastical and Chancery courts caused them to perpetrate
-various -robberies of -actions that these courts 'had developed.
Some Unknown but ingenious jurist doubtless -remarked that a
betrothal consisted of -anexchange of promises, that this lookedvery like a simple assumpsit in bilateral form, and allowed 'an
action to some jilted creature who felt that cash was :a proper
cure -for injured feelings. The first reported case -at common
law was Stretcher v. Parker,5 decided in 1639, although 'writers 'concede that the action had been allowed -for -many years prior to
that decision. 6 This jurisdictional assumption, mingling the
breach of betrothal with the breach of business agreements for
cattle, goods, -etc., flew -in-the -face 'of the whole history of -this
social transaction; -we hope to show that it ;also 'violated the
legal logic 'and theory of the action of assumpsit, and in time was
to seriously contravene public policy.
For a time the common law 'and ecclesiastical courts both
exercised jurisdiction over breach of ,promise to marry, although
action in one court barred it in the other. Generally the plaintiffs 'chose the rich -and broad damages provable in a 'contract
action at law. '1753, Lord Hardwicke's Act ended the 'ecclesi4'4 Bac. Abr. tit. "Marriage and Di1vorce", 530; Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md.
'294,45 ALt 4 9 460.
-51 'Rolle Abr. 22.
6 See language of the Court in Siort -v. Stott, 58 Ind..29.
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astical jurisdiction, and the common law was fully launched on
a career whose aid of the strumpet and adventuress was to be a
black shame within a century.
Not only did the granting of a civil contract action inject a
new feature into matrimonial engagements, but it lacks the technical requisites for an action of assumpsit.
The civil law philosophy of Savigny, followed by the works
on contracts of Sir Frederick Pollock, Anson, Clarke, 'and others,
asserts that there" is no technical contract for legal cognizance
unless the promissor intended an "act in the law",7 a legal effect
as distinguished from a social effect. X promises to provide you
with a dinner, to go to town with you to do some shopping, or
to assist you in your wooing of his daughter. X does not intend
by such promises to give you any legal claim on him, so if he
breaches them no court will support you in an action for damages
for breach of contract. A promise to marry comes- within this
same category; for the state of mind of promissor and promissee
is purely'social and emotional. Professor Williston, 8 criticizing
the writers mentioned above, says that the contract action at
common law is based on the theory of consideration, which is
not found in the civil law, and so the civil law philosophy described above has no place in the theory of the common law
action. He alleges that it is not important to determine whether
the promissor intended to effect legal or social relations, as under
the doctrine of careless misleading the promissee is entitled to
rely on the apparent state of mind of the promissor. The state of
mind of the-promissor, continues Williston, is important in connection with the consideration for his promise, the common law holding
that nothing can function as consideration and "pay for" a
promise unless it is exactly what the promissor asked for and is
intended by the promissor to be the "binder" or payment for
which he is exchanging his prdmise. Accepting the theory and
logic of Professor Williston, howiver, a promise to marry is
not demanding or thinking about anything to act as the exchange
and binder for his emotional state of mind. The promissor makes
extravagant avowals of deathless love and faith, whether or
not the other returns the affection. The promise of the other
7 Poilock Cont., p. 2.
a See I WilL Cont. 1 21.
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party is not the consideration because no consideration is asked
for under the historical legal meaning of that word.
But there remains a third point. When it allowed a contract action for breach of promise to marry the common law did
more than ignore the wisdom of history, did more than contravene the logic of contract actions in the common and civil
laws. The broad damages provable under a complaint in assumpsit opened a door 'into the horrid corridor of Fraud; the aiding of the lying and adventurous threw dangerous fuel on the
fire of disrespect for law; the legalizing of.blackmail disregarded
that public policy for general good to the greatest number which
lies behind and higher than legal technicalities or history. As
first proof of the bad policy of the action, let us look to the
writers who have spoken after careful study of the facts of cases
actually before the courts. In all six editions of his well-known
work, Schouler has violently attacked the wisdom of the action,9
stating that from his personal observations the vast majority of
plaintiffs are of low character and dubious veracity. Chadman's
Cyclopedia of Law calls the suit a "much-abused action". A
note in 7 Harvard Law Review, 372, recommends that the action
be abolished, or at least be not called a contract action and be
limited to the tort recovery for actual pecuniary damages. Professor Vernier of Stanford University, one of the editors of the
Journal of Criminal Law and a careful student of social problems,
has voiced a similar criticism. Magazines and papers have been
full of critical editorials and articles, especially since the middle
of the last century when plaintiffs realized 'the lucrativeness of
the action and began its extensive use. Lord Herschel th6ught
that England had seen enough of this prostitution of law, and in
1879, seconded by Sir Henry James, moved in the House of Commons that the action be limited to pecuniary loss, losing his motion by a vote of 106 to 65. This and other legislative attempts
have not been defeated by arguments of justice; lawyers in legislative bodies have prevented a change for the sole and selfish
reason that from these vicious suits they can and do reap large
profits.
Supporting the overwhelming tide of criticism are the actual
facts of the cases, many of which are common knowledge. Not
s Schouler on Marriage, Divorce, etc., 6th ed., 1 1302.
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long ago Evans Burroughs Fontaine, a. professional dancer,
claimed. breach of promise- against the wealthy young Whitney;
presenting a-child as his.; but by-good-fortune the. childless plaintiff was proved to have borrowed the child and" the false action
crashed, the lady being- forced to" fly from, a charge. of perjury.
the-older readers of this article will remember the public disgust
at the legalized blackmail which was .uncovered in the. New York
action brought by Zella Nicolaus against the wealthy and respected George Gould,1 0 and in the same state the great Russell
Sage had to undergo a: suit by the. fair Delia Keegan," a profligate
girl with several aliases and a record in police court.. Not many
weeks ago a woman filed suit against a Chicago man (wealthy,.
of course), alleging that his breach of promise had so damaged
her feelings as to physically prostrate her; yet her feelings were
not so delicate as to prevent her from posing on her bed of pain
for photographers, her- picture thereby being- published, for the
chuckles of the- whole reading w6rld. This. writer- has heard
numerous remarks on this incident,- all of them tinged with ridicule fora law which aids the perjured money-grabbing of MIammon-worshiping plaintiffs. In a. day- when our courts are. clogged, it is obvious that they should be.freed of all cases of this
type. Furthermore,, the abolition of the contractual action for
breach of promise would remove a source of seribus contempt
of law, such contempt being one of the most serious problems of
'our-present' American civilization..
The worst element of the: action now allowed is that the
broad, elements of damage attaching to a contract-can be proven,
including that "loss of prospects" which is the gist of every
action. In almost every case the defendant is .rich, and the
plaintiff can prove how rich he or she would become; this mercenary claim usually being camouflaged for the jury amidst
touchingtestimony about "injured feelings" and "nervous prostrations". This. legal award. of loss of"profits as though a business deal were. invoLved. is laughed, at in our- homes and brayed.
about in the ribaldry of the vaudeville stage. Recently an-elderly'
millionaire was assessed- $50,000 because that would have been
the cash profit to an ex-dancer had. she succeeded in her business
1oNIcolaus

v. Gould, N. Y.

Ca.. 54.
.U Keegan V Sage, 25 N. Y. S. 78. 31 Abb. OT.-
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deal o matrimony. High Olym pus must -have rocked with the
laughter of the gods!
If this action should be abolished, -anyone really injured
would still be protected. The statutory action for seduction remains. Money spent or property given over could be recovered
on the theories of deceit -or quasi ;contract, or by statute. A
.growing disrespect -for law, a growing lightness of the attitude
toward engagements and marriages, call for prompt action.

